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The Roadmap Ripped Up: Lessons from Gaza in the Second Intifada 
James Rodgers 
 
It was a time of war, and a time of diplomacy. A decade later, the diplomacy is all but 
spent—bereft of ideas, at least. The fighting continues to flare up in Gaza like the eruptions 
of a volcano that is sometimes quiet, but never extinct. The causes behind it are not as old as 
the prehistoric faults that shoot molten rock skyward, although they too are ancient. Like the 
lava flow, they have defied any attempt to render them harmless—in this case, to make them 
an inspiration for peace rather than grounds for fighting. 
From 2002 to 2004, I was the BBC’s correspondent in the Gaza Strip. At the time, I 
was the only international journalist permanently based in the territory. Relations between 
Israel and the Palestinians were different then. Not that they were less hostile: this was the 
time of the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising against Israel, and of frequent Israeli 
military operations in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank. They were different in that 
different factors influenced and defined them. The main political power in Gaza then was the 
Palestinian Authority, dominated by members of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement. Jewish 
settlers, in defiance of most interpretations of international law save that of the Israeli 
government and its closest allies, still lived at strategic intervals throughout the desert and 
scrubland of the stiflingly crowded seaside territory. There was, in the shape of the Roadmap, 
a continuing political process that, extending its diplomatic travel metaphor, brightly claimed 
in its opening paragraph, “The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005.”1 A different Gaza in a different phase of Israeli-
Palestinian relations, yet one that, for less frequently recognized reasons, which this article 
will discuss, was the departure point for the diplomacy, which never reached its ambitious 
destination.  
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The Roadmap was formally presented on 30 April 2003 at a ceremony in Ramallah. 
Some five weeks later, on 4 June, a meeting held at the Jordan Red Sea resort of Aqaba 
brought the then Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers, Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, 
together with President George W. Bush. Arafat was then still the president of the Palestinian 
Authority, but the Israelis would no longer negotiate with him, so he was not invited. It was 
also not clear whether, if he were to leave his compound in Ramallah, Israel would allow him 
to return. The summit was designed to give the leaders an opportunity to publicly pledge 
support for the new plan. This they duly did. In statements that were presumably discussed 
with (if not actually drafted by) the Bush administration, Sharon spoke of “two states—Israel 
and a Palestinian state—living side by side in peace and security.”’2 Abbas spoke of “two 
states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side, in peace and security.”3 Can we, at this 
distance, read something into Sharon’s choice of the phrase “Palestinian state” as opposed to 
Abbas’s less equivocal “Palestine?” It matters little. For nothing so far has come of these fine 
words, and today there seems little prospect of the situation changing. In those weeks 
between the formal presentation of the plan and the summit, there was an incident at the 
northern edge of the Gaza Strip that received little attention at the time but which gave a 
clearer picture of the real state of relations between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships 
than any amount of expertly written and edited statements for the international news media. It 
is worth mentioning now because it served to humiliate Abbas and belittle him in the eyes of 
many in Gaza. It happened on Wednesday morning, 21 May 2003. Abbas was due to visit the 
Gaza Strip. Most of the journalists in Gaza—I was among them—travelled toward the Erez 
crossing point between the territory and Israel in anticipation of his arrival.  
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A reporter covering conflict quickly acquires the ability to sense at a distance when 
something dangerous lies ahead. That sense, however, is not always reliable. It is unsettling 
when suddenly it becomes active. Where, in rural areas of a peaceful country, the sight of 
empty roads and open spaces brings a sense of calm, in a conflict zone the absence of people 
and traffic has the opposite effect. They are signs of danger. The pulse quickens; the senses 
seem to become more acute. So it was that morning. A small crowd of journalists and 
officials had gathered on the forecourt of a petrol station a few hundred meters short of where 
they might have been expected to wait. They were not milling around as such a group might 
have been in normal circumstances. Rather, they seemed to have taken the trouble to put the 
concrete walls of the petrol station between them and the road ahead. While not exactly 
taking cover, they seemed aware that the moment might come when suddenly they needed to. 
A short distance along the road, among the stumps of an old orange orchard, recently ripped 
up on the grounds that the trees had been used as cover from which Palestinian fighters had 
launched mortars and crude rockets against Israeli targets, there were two Israeli tanks. It 
would have been foolhardy to go further down the road. It became apparent that Abbas would 
not be able to travel in from the opposite direction, either—a fact soon confirmed by a 
slightly nervous Palestinian official. The journalists dispersed, delaying their departure only 
to take a few pictures of teenage boys throwing rocks in the general direction of the tanks. 
Israel’s preventing Abbas from entering the territory that day received little attention. The 
international headlines were dominated by a reported al Qaeda threat to transatlantic 
passenger aircraft. But the incident may well still have been in Abbas’s thoughts when he 
spoke at the summit a couple of weeks afterward. Its significance certainly was not lost on 
the people of Gaza. A leader can only suffer so many of these personal setbacks before his 
authority is diminished. Later that summer, as a short ceasefire collapsed and violence 
erupted once more, a grubby street kid suggested that the second of two Israeli military 
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helicopters in the air over Gaza City was carrying Abu Mazen, the honorific by which Abbas 
was popularly known. Implying in Gaza then—as now—that someone was collaborating with 
the Israelis was about as bad as it could get. Abbas and, by extension, much of the Palestinian 
Authority leadership found themselves in an impossible situation: seen as weak by many 
parts of their own constituency and their attempts to promote constructive dialogue 
undermined by their supposed negotiating partners’ attempts to make them appear powerless. 
Five months later, and only a few hundred meters from where the shamefaced official had 
confirmed what everyone around suspected, that Abbas would not be visiting Gaza that day, a 
second incident served to underline the gap between what happened on the ground and what 
was indicated by the Roadmap.  
A roadside bomb ripped into a small convoy carrying several US officials toward 
Gaza City from the crossing point at Erez. Violent death was nothing new along this stretch 
of road, but US officials had never before been targeted, let alone killed. The attack seemed 
all the more shocking because the officials were said to have been on their way to interview 
candidates for scholarships to the United States. Their journeys into the territory seemed 
fairly frequent. Their gray, four-wheel drive vehicles were a fairly common sight at the 
crossing point—memorable to frequent travelers for the fact that not all of the delegation 
were required to present their documents in person. In the face of security measures that drew 
occasional verbal complaints from European Union diplomats that the Israeli soldiers on duty 
did not respect their rights under the Vienna Convention, this was a privilege indeed. Where 
other vehicles were required to stop over an inspection pit, the US diplomatic cars came to a 
brief halt, engines still running. One of the car’s occupants would then leap out, sunglasses 
shading his eyes from the blinding Middle Eastern sun, and present the passes of all the 
people inside. They were invariably waved through with a smile. There was no such safe 
passage in the aftermath of the attack. When US investigators arrived on the scene later that 
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day, they were forced to withdraw as a crowd that had gathered to look at the debris first 
jeered and then threw rocks. The Palestinian police—no experts in crowd control, the bomb 
site had not even been cordoned off—opened fire into the air with live ammunition. The 
investigators were able to make good their escape. The deaths that day were sufficiently 
shocking not only to be widely reported, but also to be fictionalized a matter of months later. 
In an episode of season five of television show West Wing, titled simply “Gaza,” first 
broadcast the following year, the attack was used as the basis for a bombing in which a 
number of members of fictional President Bartlet’s administration were killed. Aside from 
being shocking, the attack was significant in that it reminded the rest of the world that there 
was an element of Palestinian society for whom “cooperation” and “collaboration” were 
synonymous: no matter that one of the US mission’s aims was to provide Gazans with 
opportunity for study. 
That stretch of road, the last few hundred meters before the Erez crossing point, was 
the scene of countless acts of violence in the summer of 2003. So frequently was it closed, or, 
when it was open, dangerous, that it came almost to symbolize the folly of having chosen the 
term roadmap to describe the peace plan. Frequent road closures, and disputes over who had 
the right to use which roads, were a gift to cynics and reporters looking for a headline to 
undermine official optimism. Palestinians were not oblivious to the irony. A teenaged 
student, who had just picked her wary way across a fractured road surface as she made her 
way home from school, found the term too bitter to say. No sooner had she uttered it than she 
burst into tears and could speak on the prospects for peace no more. This was the kind of 
despair that reinforced, and deepened, hatred. It led too to the diplomatic dead end that exists 
today. Intelligent, realistic, determined voices from those days have been silenced. Yossi 
Alpher and Ghassan Khatib coedited the bitterlemons website for more than a decade. In 
August 2012, Alpher posted a piece called, “Why We Are Closing.’”4 “There is no peace 
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process and no prospect of one,” he wrote. A blunter, less optimistic assessment from a well-
informed observer is difficult to imagine.  
The seeds of such nihilism predate the second intifada, and it should perhaps have 
been obvious to more people that they were likely to grow into the impenetrable thicket that 
stands today. Editors reprimanded reporters in the region for their reluctance to join the 
chorus of cheers. One experienced correspondent from a major news organization 
complained that he had been roundly criticized for a piece that suggested the optimism that 
came with the Roadmap was less than well founded. I found myself struggling to explain why 
I could not send a report on the celebrations in Gaza that would follow the official 
presentation of the peace plan. The reason was simple—there would be none—and yet 
apparently it was understood only with some difficulty by my colleague in London who had 
called to commission the story. I was correct in my assessment that there would not be flag 
waving, dancing, or celebration of any sort. It was based, more than anything, on the gut 
feeling that reporters are supposed to have for the way things are likely to turn out in their 
“patch,” as British journalistic slang calls the area a correspondent covers. In a way, it was 
akin to “news sense,” that intangible newsroom quality that enables a journalist to know a 
story when he or she sees one. 
Even before I left Gaza in the spring of 2004, though, I was seeking a sounder basis to 
explain the reasons for my sense that the Roadmap led nowhere. Taking a week away from 
news reporting to try to consider the conflict in greater depth enabled me to start formulating 
more detailed interpretations. In February 2004 I recorded for a radio documentary a number 
of interviews with people living in Gaza. My purpose was to try to step back from the detail 
of daily news and try to assess deeper issues, issues of how history affected the present. This 
after all was a place in which, on one of my first outings as a reporter in August 2002, I had 
been taken to task for something that happened long before I was born. An elderly gentleman, 
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living in the ruins of a refugee camp blasted by the latest bout of armed conflict, had offered 
first a welcome and then a reprimand. Why had the Balfour Declaration ever been made? he 
demanded to know. Two constant currents seemed to run through the history of the region 
between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan: land and faith. Land here should not be 
understood as a purely economic commodity, although of course land here in the sense of 
somewhere to buy, sell, cultivate or build upon, is extremely important. Instead, land can best 
be understood as “homeland,” which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “a person's 
home country or native land; the land of one's ancestors,” a description that resonates right 
through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Roadmap, as published then,5 mentioned “faith” 
only in the sense of negotiating “in good faith”(page 1).6 The text does mention “religious 
concerns” and “religious interests” (page 7), but only in the penultimate paragraph of a 
seven-page document. “Land” appeared in the phrase “land for peace” (page 1); “homeland” 
was absent. Did the document’s authors, perhaps hearing the anger, undiminished by passing 
decades, of the refugee prefer the more sterile word “state” instead? Did a state, the word 
having no connotations of ancestral entitlement or divine gift, somehow seem easier to create 
than a homeland?  
These issues of land and faith seemed everywhere once questions were asked that 
went beyond the accounts of daily news reporting. I began gathering material for the radio 
program, Middle East and Home,7 with the group in Gaza that was then the most 
newsworthy: the Jewish settlers. The settlers had started coming to Gaza after Israel had 
taken the territory from Egypt in the 1967 War. They were stunned when, on 2 February 
2004, Ariel Sharon announced that they would be moved out. At that time, the settlers 
refused to believe that Sharon’s intention would become reality. It was he, after all, who had 
decided where their homes, hothouses, and fortifications should be built in order to maximize 
Israel’s dominance of the territory. In his autobiography, Warrior, he describes the 
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settlements as “fingers,”8 as if they reached out to grip the people living there. The most 
contentious of them was Netzarim, south of Gaza City. Its presence caused untold 
inconvenience to Gaza’s Palestinian residents. It led to road closures, which were designed to 
protect the neat white houses and their residents from attack, but which also meant that travel 
south of Gaza City was usually difficult and circuitous—and sometimes dangerous and all 
but impossible. Even some Israelis saw its presence as provocative. Yossi Sarid, a minister in 
the cabinet of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, once called it a “bone in the throat”9—a 
description that was frequently repeated by Palestinians. As the intifada wore on, the 
surrounding area became a free-fire zone too dangerous to enter. Shepherds and farm workers 
were likely to be treated in the same way as attackers, and shot on sight. The Israeli Army, 
however, did not necessarily relish defending Netzarim. One officer to whom I occasionally 
spoke said, on learning of my plans to visit, that he could never understand why anyone 
would want to live there.  
It was a question that Netzarim’s residents were not always keen to answer. For 
eighteen months, I had been asking the settlers’ spokesman, Eran Sternberg, for permission to 
go there. Each time, the answer had been “no.” The BBC was not popular with the settlers—
nor, indeed, was anyone who chose not to share their unshakeable vision that they were doing 
the right thing. However, Sharon’s announcement that they were to be moved—although they 
professed not to believe that it would or could come to pass—had led them to start something 
of a public relations offensive, and I was given the chance to visit. To go there in normal 
times would have been a matter of a short drive or taxi ride. Getting there in the middle of the 
intifada was far more complicated. I had to leave my apartment in Gaza City and travel to the 
Erez crossing point at the territory’s northern edge. From there I drove south (I could go by 
car, as my vehicle had German number plates—either Israeli or Palestinian plates would have 
made my journey impossible), roughly parallel with the fence that marked Gaza’s eastern 
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extent. I left my car in a parking lot at the edge of Israeli territory. It was controlled by the 
Israeli Army, which carefully checked all who came there. No civilian vehicle was allowed to 
go any further. Anyone given permission to travel on to Netzarim had to board a bus to do so. 
My main memory of the journey was being warned to slouch down in my seat once 
the bus got out into open land and, therefore, potentially hostile areas. While the bus, it 
seemed, was armored, the reinforced glass only extended so high up the window. An adult 
sitting up straight risked exposing head and neck to bullets. The land here was empty; cleared 
in a way that gave a sense of extreme danger, of absences imposed at gunpoint. There was a 
mosque, the continuing presence of which Sternberg, who accompanied me, pointed out as 
evidence that the army would never demolish a sacred building. This hardly seemed the 
point, however, when any would-be worshippers had long been driven far away. The terrain 
around the settlement had been razed to remove any cover for potential attackers. The only 
shapes which stood out as the eye scanned the land were those of tank turrets, half hidden. 
Hazard and hostility may have filled the land beyond Netzarim’s borders; inside there was 
orderly calm. Well-watered lawns lay before whitewashed, red-roofed, houses. The road 
surfaces leading up to those neat dwellings were of smooth asphalt—none of the sand and 
potholes that were more typical of the roads in most of the rest of Gaza. The quiet could not 
have provided a greater contrast with the noise, dust, and chaos that characterized the 
crowded streets and back alleys of the territory’s cramped towns and refugee camps. There 
was a school. Primary-age pupils sat quietly listening to their lesson—so quietly that music 
could be heard drifting in from a next-door classroom. The notes, thin, played by some kind 
of electronic toy or other device, were distant, but the tune was unmistakable: “No Place Like 
Home.” It was hard to say what kind of a home this could be. The classroom was clean and 
bright. Children’s drawings cheered up the walls. The playground to which the children ran 
after their classes seem typical too—until your eye caught the soldier under the tree a few 
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meters from the swings, or looked out again over the land cleared of cover for attackers, and 
settled once more on tank turret semiobscured in the scrubland.  
Yet this was home. Home to, among others, Tammy Silberschein, whose flawless 
English was that of a native speaker. Silberschein had come from the United States eight 
years earlier. When we met, she held Shmuel, the youngest of her five children, in her arms. 
Suggestions that living in Netzarim was dangerous were dismissed with comparisons with the 
threat of suicide bombers in cafes and buses across Israel; suggestions that the settlers’ 
presence was provocative received an even blunter response: “When they say that we don’t 
have a right to be here, they don’t mean here Gaza, they mean here in the entire state of 
Israel. They don’t think that the Jews have a right to be in Israel at all,” Silberschein said of 
those who would have shared the “bone in the throat” view of the settlement. For her, this too 
was Israel. Internationally recognized borders had no meaning. “Being a Torah observant 
Jew, we are taught that this is the Jewish homeland, we have to be sovereign here, and we 
have to settle all parts of it, but any non-Jews who would like to join us peacefully and live 
with us certainly can, and they’re welcome. That’s part of the,” she hesitated, pausing to 
choose words, “that certainly can fit in with the ultimate plan.” I asked if she could ever see 
that happening in reality. “I have a strong belief in the prophecies,” she replied. “And the 
prophecies talk about non-Jews coming to our temple, and bringing sacrifices, and we’re 
going to be one big family, and there’s going to be peace, and absolutely I believe in peace. 
It’s very hard to see it now, but if I didn’t have a vision, then I wouldn’t be able to live here.” 
The people of Netzarim, of course, no longer do. The evacuation of the settlements in 
Gaza did go ahead the following year, incredulous as their residents were then, in early spring 
2004. Their ideas, though, seem as enduring as the prophecies they claim as their basis. For 
while the Jewish settlements of Gaza may have gone, their counterparts on the West Bank 
have grown incessantly to the extent that the “fingers” that Sharon once foresaw seem feeble 
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by comparison. In a document published in late 2012 by its Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations said that, in 2011, the settler population was 
estimated at over 520,000.10 The document also said that the annual average rate of growth 
during the preceding decade was 5.3 percent (excluding East Jerusalem), compared to 1.8 
percent for the Israeli population as a whole. The same month, December 2012, the European 
Union reiterated its view that Israeli plans to expand settlements “would seriously undermine 
the prospects of a negotiated resolution of the conflict by jeopardizing the possibility of a 
contiguous and viable Palestinian state and of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states.”11 
That would suit Silberschein and her fellow settlers just fine, of course, and not just them. 
The support that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu first expressed for the two-state 
solution in 2009, and has repeated since, does not convince his critics—especially while he 
has overseen the expansion in West Bank settlement, which undermines the prospects of the 
solution ever coming to pass.  
In Gaza, then, it was not just the settlers and their Israeli supporters who shunned the 
idea of two states. Even in the summer of 2003 and afterward, while the Roadmap lay on the 
table apparently being taken seriously, there seemed little prospect of its success. Scratch the 
surface, dig a little deeper, and you soon found Palestinian views that were equally 
uncompromising. Add to this the massive military and diplomatic support that Israel enjoyed 
from the United States, and one sees that there was little incentive for Israel to move forward. 
The status quo would be just fine—and that seems to have been the predominant view of 
Israeli administrations in the intervening decade. For the Palestinians of Gaza, jobless and 
trapped, the same could not be said, and, while they perhaps would have welcomed a small 
state as a kind of breathing space, there were many whose words suggested they did not see 
that as a final, acceptable situation. I stress words here. It may be that, should the opportunity 
of statehood ever arise in earnest, the rhetoric could be quietly laid to one side—but there 
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currently is no sign of an opportunity of statehood. I would like next to expand on what I 
mean by uncompromising views—and would add that the Gaza I describe here is one that 
was run by the Palestinian Authority. There is no reason to think 2013 opinion in the 
territory, controlled for years by Hamas, and battered by major Israeli operations in 2009 and 
2012, is anything other than more hardened.  
Rafah, at the southern edge of the Gaza Strip, has become known for its tunnels, 
through which goods and people are smuggled in from Egypt. They were there in the days of 
the Roadmap, too, although their numbers seem to have increased. Pretty much everything 
seemed to come through them: packets of cigarettes bought in southern Gaza bore warnings 
from the Egyptian Ministry of Health; an Israeli Army officer once explained to me that they 
knew when a new supply of ammunition had been smuggled in because their informants told 
them the price of Kalashnikov bullets had fallen. The presence of the tunnels was the main 
reason for the launching in October 2003 of Operation Root Canal. Some tunnel entrances 
were apparently concealed inside houses close to the border. Where that was the case, the 
houses were demolished, as were properties from which Palestinian fighters were said to have 
fired upon the Israeli Army positions that stood between Rafah and the Egyptian border.
 According to the United Nations, the initial phase of the Israeli military operation 
destroyed 148 “shelters” (houses or other dwellings), and between October and the end of 
2003, more than three thousand people lost their homes.12 I spoke to some of them then, in 
the heat of what passed for autumn in Gaza, as they sought to salvage what they could from 
the rubble that had been their homes. Odd shoes and torn schoolbooks poked out from the 
ruins, turning up as more valuable possessions were sought (in some cases, these included 
title deeds to long-lost but not forgotten properties in British Mandate–era Palestine). When it 
prepared to demolish a house, the Israeli Army did give warnings to the inhabitants to leave, 
but, judging by the accounts of those forced to flee, the time was sufficient only for the able 
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bodied to escape—often without belongings. The death while I was there of a woman said to 
be eight months pregnant seemed to support this claim, as did the number of people who said 
they were looking through the rubble to find jewelry or cash. It was a heated, hectic time in 
the most dangerous part of the Palestinian territories. Rafah would probably have been in the 
news more had it been closer to Jerusalem, where most of the international news media were 
based. The scale of the house demolitions attracted activists from Europe and the United 
States. Two of them, Rachel Corrie and Tom Hurndall, paid for their protests with their 
lives.13 For the most part, though, house demolitions during the intifada were just part of life 
as usual in Rafah. That did not mean that people came to accept them. In fact, the opposite 
was true. When I returned to Rafah for my radio documentary, the warm sun of October had 
been replaced by the cool, wet, weather of February. The passage of time seemed to have 
made tempers even hotter. 
 The Yibna area of the Rafah refugee camp took its name from the village in Mandate-
era Palestine from which its residents, or their ancestors, had fled in 1948. In the winter of 
2003–2004 following Operation Root Canal, it was especially grim. The United Nations, 
which took responsibility for housing the refugees and their descendants, was reluctant to 
rebuild in the area where houses had been destroyed, reasoning that the new buildings might 
one day be flattened as the old ones had been. So some of those made newly homeless lived 
where they could on the land. If they had managed to rent a room somewhere safer in the 
town, it did not necessarily guarantee space for the whole family to sleep, and it could have 
been intolerably crowded during the day. Naji Abu Hashem and his family fell into that 
category. I met them cooking on a fire in the wasteland, clothes hanging nearby in air that, 
unusual for Gaza, was too wet to dry them. Abu Hashem’s house had been demolished some 
months earlier. He and his family now spent their days in the open air. The jacket he wore 
seemed too thin to keep out the bone-chilling damp. He lifted his round, unshaven, and 
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mustachioed face from the pot on the fire to talk. The United Nations had offered him a new 
house, but in Khan Younis, the Gaza Strip’s second city, north of Yibna. He did not wish to 
go. Abu Hashem and many of his fellow refugees, here made newly homeless, feared that to 
leave the land now was to give it up forever. They did not particularly appreciate the United 
Nations’ reluctance to rebuild here, understandable as it may have seemed to an outsider. Abu 
Hashem’s logic drew on his people’s recent history. Everyone here, he argued, was a refugee, 
either from 1948 or 1967. Where he asked, were they supposed to go a third time? “This is 
my religion [which] tell[s] me to stay here,” he said. “This is my Palestinian land. This is our 
land.” His sentiments were echoed by Emad Abu Matr, whom I had met in the autumn, 
rummaging through the broken cinder blocks that had once been his walls. Abu Matr was not 
to be found in Yibna day we later spoke, but in his office in Rafah itself, further from the 
front line. He seemed to remember our earlier conversation, and, for a man who had lost so 
much in the last few months, seemed calm and composed. As our conversation continued, 
however, he became agitated. The anger he must have felt at having his house destroyed 
seemed to return. “For the time being they are the stronger,” he conceded of the Israelis. 
“They can make what they want. But the future is coming.” In the end, he offered an 
interpretation of a sacred text to justify his bitter optimism, even suggesting that “in [the] 
Quran it says the Israeli state will finish. We have to believe that the Israeli state will finish 
one day and we will go back to our homeland. The time is not known. But we believe this.”  
 What kind of compromise can be possible, what kind of progress toward peace, when 
such views are so deeply and devoutly held? What struck me in my conversations with Abu 
Matr and Silberschein was that both expressed a willingness to share the land, the physical 
land, but not sovereignty thereon. Both, like Abu Hashem, gave religion as a reason for their 
insistence. It could be argued that such views are not representative. Later that year, back in 
Europe, I met a Palestinian diplomat whom I had known in Gaza. He gently chided me for 
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my bleak view of the prospects for peace, saying that as I had been in Gaza during the 
intifada, a terrible time, I had formed too pessimistic a view of the situation. I wonder what 
he would say now. Still, yes, it may be that the views which I have chosen to consider here 
are not representative. My contact in the Israeli Army who expressed incomprehension that 
anyone would want to live in Netzarim probably had a view much more widely held than that 
of Silberschein; Palestinians who have had their houses demolished are naturally less likely 
to be among the most outspoken voices for peace. Yet the views are there, and nothing that I 
have seen in recent years has persuaded me that they have become less influential: on the 
contrary. On my last visit to the region, in September 2011, faith seemed rather to have come 
even more to the fore. By that time, Hamas was running the Gaza Strip. The secular 
Palestinian nationalism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) seemed already to 
belong to an earlier age, an idea which had failed to deliver. It had failed and its time had 
passed. The house where I was staying in East Jerusalem was a couple of streets away from 
one that had been taken over by settlers. The Israeli flag fluttered defiantly in an area of the 
Holy City that the Palestinians have long hoped would be their future capital. Perhaps the 
conclusions about faith, land, and sovereignty that had presented themselves in 2004 were not 
the overly pessimistic views of one seeing a place at a particularly bad time. The words of 
those to whom I spoke then echo now, and indeed have been amplified. Before the elections 
in 2012, David Remnick travelled to Israel to report on what the New Yorker, for which he 
wrote a long and compelling account of his trip, called on its cover “the emerging religious 
right.” Remnick’s principle interviewee was Naftali Bennett, of the Jewish Home Party. 
Bennett is considered by some—probably himself included—as a possible future Israeli 
prime minister. Although this was the first time I had read such a lengthy interview with 
Bennett, his words and sentiments seemed familiar. His assertion that “the land is ours”14 and 
that there is no distinction between land within Israel’s internationally recognized borders and 
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land in Gaza or on the West Bank, could just as well have come from Silberschein or 
Sternberg.15 Bennett and his party may not have done as well in the election as some had 
expected, but they have established a presence in the Knesset that provides a basis for further 
advances. The sentiments that he shared with the Gaza settlers of a decade earlier were no 
longer beyond Israel’s political and geographical boundaries but on the edge of the 
mainstream.  
 Moves for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, if indeed there are going to be 
any, need to take account of the way that things have changed. Looking at the situation now, 
though, it seems that if there might just have been, at some point, the possibility of peace 
being agreed between the generations of Israeli politicians for whom the Labor Party was the 
natural home and the secular Palestinian nationalists of the PLO, that time has gone. In 
addition, the recent elections not only in Israel but also in the United States have returned to 
office two leaders who have struggled to find a successful personal relationship or common 
ground in their political vision. Increasingly, it seems the agenda on both sides of the conflict 
is being set, or at least influenced, by people to whom compromise is anathema, people who 
are guided by religion more than any Roadmap. 
This phenomenon is not confined to Israel and the Palestinian territories. The Arab 
uprisings that began in 2011 have given religion a bigger role in politics in the surrounding 
region, too. The argument I advance here is not intended as some inspirational revelation that 
will set the course for a new round of fruitful peace negotiations. It is a request for those who 
have sought to advance conventional diplomatic solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to 
recognize that ideas of faith and homeland lie at its core, and that these need to be taken into 
account. They are not addressed as simply as material loss or damage might be. The 
reprimand I received over the Balfour Declaration, and the words I heard then in Gaza, and 
their echoes today, persuade me of that. “War, that is the animosity and the reciprocal effects 
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of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s will has not 
been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been 
driven to ask for peace, or the population made to submit,” wrote von Clausewitz (italics in 
the original).16 Faith can make that will stronger than the threat of blood or the promise of 
treasure alone can. It may be that a way can be found to allow the conflicting faiths to 
emphasize peace. If so, perhaps faith can assist in finding a way forward. There would 
certainly seem to be none that does not take faith into account.  
 
James Rodgers is lecturer in journalism at City University, London, and a former BBC 
correspondent in Moscow, Brussels, and Gaza. He is the author of Reporting Conflict and No 
Road Home: Fighting for Land and Faith in Gaza.  
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